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Abstract
A simple framework for reasoning under uncertainty and intervention
is introduced. This is achieved in three steps. First, logic is restated in
set-theoretic terms to obtain a framework for reasoning under certainty.
Second, this framework is extended to model reasoning under uncertainty.
Finally, causal spaces are introduced and shown how they provide enough
information to model knowledge containing causal information about the
world.
1 Bayesian Probability Theory
It is advantageous to endow plausibilities with an explanatory framework that
has a logically intuitive appeal. Such a framework is Bayesian probability theory.
Simply put, Bayesian probability theory is a framework that extends logic for
reasoning under uncertainty.
1.1 Reasoning under Certainty
Logic is the most important framework of reasoning (under certainty). Here, it
is rephrased in set-theoretic terms1. As will be seen, this facilitates its extension
to a framework for reasoning under uncertainty.
Let Ω be a set of outcomes, which is assumed to be finite for simplicity. A
subset A ⊂ Ω is an event. Let c, ∪ and ∩ be the set-operations of complement,
union and intersection respectively. Let F be an algebra, i.e. a set of events
obeying the axioms
A1. F 6= ∅.
A2. A ∈ F ⇒ Ac ∈ F .
A3. A,B ∈ F ⇒ A ∪B ∈ F .
1Strictly speaking, this set-theoretic logic is “a logic within logic”, since set theory is based
on standard logic.
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In this framework, an outcome ω ∈ Ω is a state of affairs and an event A ∈ F
is a proposition. Hence, a singleton {ω} ∈ F is an irreducible (i.e. atomic)
proposition about the world. The set-operations c, ∪ and ∩ correspond to
the logical connectives of ¬ (negation), ∨ (disjunction) and ∧ (conjunction)
respectively. They allow the construction of complex propositions from simpler
ones. An algebra is a system of propositions that is closed under negation and
disjunction (and hence is closed under conjunction as well), i.e. it comprises all
propositions that the reasoner might entertain.
Remark 1. A trivial consequence of the axioms is that both the universal event
Ω and the impossible event ∅ are in F .
The objective of logic is to allow the reasoner to conclude the veracity of
events given information. Let V := {1, 0, ?} be the set of truth states, where
1 is true, 0 is false, and ? is uncertain (but known to be either true or false).
From these, {1, 0} are called truth values. The truth function is the set
function T over F × F defined as
A,B ∈ F , T(A|B) =


1 if B ⊂ A,
0 if A ∩B = ∅,
? else.
Furthermore, define the shorthand T(A) := T(A|Ω). The quantity T(A|B)
stands for the “truth value of event A given that event B is true”. Accordingly,
the knowledge of the reasoner about the facts of the world is represented by his
truth function and his algebra. From his point of view, a proposition can be
either true, false or uncertain (i.e. having an unresolved truth value given his
knowledge). Understanding the definition of the truth function is straightfor-
ward. Claiming that an event B ∈ F is true means that one of its members
ω ∈ B is the current outcome/state of affairs. Hence the veracity of A given
B is evaluated as follows (Figure 1): if A contains every outcome in B then it
must be true as well; if A is known not to contain any of B’s outcome then it
must be false; and if A contains only part of B then it cannot be resolved, since
knowing that ω ∈ B does neither imply that ω ∈ A nor ω ∈ Ac. The definition
of a truth space follows.
Definition 1 (Truth Space). A truth space is a tuple (Ω,F ,T) where: Ω is a
set of outcomes, F is an algebra over Ω and T : F ×F → V is a truth function.
The intuitive meaning of a truth space is as follows. Nature arbitrarily
selects an outcome ω ∈ Ω. (This choice is not governed by a generative law.)
Subsequently, the reasoner performs a measurement: he chooses a set B and
nature reveals to him whether ω ∈ B or not. Accordingly, the reasoners infers
the veracity of any event A ∈ F by evaluating either T(A|B) (if ω ∈ B) or
T(A|Bc) (if ω /∈ B).
Several measurements are combined as a conjunction. Thus, if the reasoner
learns that ω is in B1, B2, . . . , and Bt after performing t measurements, then
the truth value is T(A|B1 ∩ · · · ∩Bt) for any A ∈ F .
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T(A|A) = 1 T(Ac|A) = 0
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Ω
Figure 1: A truth space. It is known that the true outcome ω ∈ Ω is in A.
Hence, (a) the event A is true and (b) its complement Ac is false. (c) Any event
that contains a true event is true as well. (d) An event that contains only part
of a true event is uncertain.
Remark 2. Knowing that ω ∈ Ω does not resolve uncertainty, i.e. T(A|Ω) = ?
for any A ∈ F \ {Ω,∅}, while knowing that ω ∈ {ω} resolves all uncertainty,
i.e. T(A|{ω}) ∈ {0, 1} for any A ∈ F .
Remark 3. The set relation B ⊂ A corresponds to the logical relation B ⇒ A.
Since an algebra is an encoding of how sets are contained within each other, it
should be clear that an algebra is essentially a system of implications.
1.2 Reasoning under Uncertainty
Unlike logic, Bayesian probability theory allows reasoning under uncertainty.
For this end, it provides a consistent mechanism to replace the uncertainty
state ? with a numerical value in the interval [0, 1] representing degrees of truth,
belief or plausibility.
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B(A|B) = T(A|B) = 0 B(A|B) = B(A∩B|Ω)
B(B|Ω)
B(A|B) = T(A|B) = 1
Figure 2: Extension of Truth Function.
The goal is to find a suitable definition of a quantity B(A|B) meaning “the
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degree of belief in event A given that event B is true” that is consistent with the
truth function when it is certain, i.e. B(A|B) := T(A|B) if T(A|B) ∈ {0, 1}.
Consider the three situations in Figure 2. (a) In the case A ∩ B = ∅, we
impose B(A|B) := T(A|B) = 0. (b) In the case B ⊂ A, we impose B(A|B) :=
T(A|B) = 1. (c) In the intermediate case where T(A|B) = ?, the event A only
partially covers the members of B. If one interprets the quantity B(C|D) as
“the fraction of D contained in C”, then one can characterize B(A|B) with the
relation
B(A|B) =
B(A ∩B|Ω)
B(B|Ω)
as long as B(B|Ω) > 0. It is easy to see that this formula generalizes correctly
to the border cases, since B(A|B) = 0
B(B|Ω) = 0 when A∩B = ∅ and B(A|B) =
B(B|Ω)
B(B|Ω) = 1 when B ⊂ A. Noting that B = B ∩ Ω and rearranging terms, one
gets
B(A ∩B|Ω) = B(B|Ω)B(A|B ∩ Ω).
This relation should hold under any restriction to a “universal” set C ∈ F , not
only when it is restricted to Ω. Thus, replacing Ω by C one obtains
B(A ∩B|C) = B(B|C)B(A|B ∩C),
which is known as the product rule for beliefs. Following a similar reasoning,
we impose that for any event A ∈ F , the sum of the degree of belief in A and
its complement Ac must be true under any condition B, i.e.
B(A|B) +B(Ac|B) = 1,
which is known as the sum rule for beliefs. In summary, we impose the following
axioms for beliefs.
Definition 2 (Belief axioms). Let Ω be a set of outcomes and let F be an
algebra over Ω. A set function P over F × F is a belief function iff
B1. A,B ∈ F , B(A|B) ∈ [0, 1].
B2. A,B ∈ F , B(A|B) = 1 if B ⊂ A.
B3. A,B ∈ F , B(A|B) = 0 if A ∩B = ∅.
B4. A,B ∈ F , B(A|B) +B(Ac|B) = 1.
B5. A,B,C ∈ F , B(A ∩B|C) = B(A|C)B(B|A ∩ C).
Furthermore, define the shorthand B(A) := B(A|Ω). Axiom B1 states that
degrees of belief are real values in the unit interval [0, 1]. Axioms B2 and B3
equate the belief and the truth function under certainty. Axioms B4 and B5 are
the structural requirements under uncertainty discussed above. Accordingly,
one defines a belief space as follows.
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Definition 3 (Belief Space). A belief space is a tuple (Ω,F ,B) where: Ω is
a set of outcomes, F is an algebra over Ω and B : F × F → [0, 1] is a belief
function.
The intuitive meaning of a belief space is analogous to a truth space. Nature
arbitrarily selects an outcome ω ∈ Ω. Subsequently, the reasoner performs a
measurement: he chooses a set B and nature reveals to him whether ω ∈ B or
not. Accordingly, the reasoners infers the degree of belief in any event A ∈ F
by evaluating either B(A|B) (if ω ∈ B) or B(A|Bc) (if ω /∈ B).
Remark 4. The word “subsequently”, that has been emphasized for the sec-
ond time now, is crucial. When the reasoner performs his measurements, the
outcome is already determined.
An easy but fundamental result is that the axioms of belief are equivalent
to the axioms of probability2. This simple observation is what constitutes the
foundation of Bayesian probability theory.
1.3 Bayes’ Rule
We now return to the central topic of this chapter. Suppose the reasoner has
uncertainty over a set of competing hypotheses about the world. Subsequently,
he makes an observation. He can use this observation to update his beliefs about
the hypotheses. The following theorem explains how to carry out this update.
Theorem 1 (Bayes’ Rule). Let (Ω,F ,B) be a belief space. Let {H1, . . . , HN}
be a partition of Ω, and let D ∈ F be an event such that B(D) > 0. Then, for
all n ∈ {1, . . . , N},
B(Hn|D) =
B(D|Hn)B(Hn)
B(D)
=
B(D|Hn)B(Hn)∑
mB(D|Hm)B(Hm)
.
The interpretation is as follows. The H1, . . . , HN represent N mutually ex-
clusive hypotheses, and the event D represents an new observation or data.
Initially, the reasoner holds a prior belief B(Hn) over each hypothesis Hn.
Subsequently, he incorporates the observation of the event D and arrives at a
posterior belief B(Hn|D) over each hypothesis Hn. Bayes’ rule states that
this update can be seen as combining the prior belief B(Hn) with the like-
lihood B(D|Hn) of observation D under hypothesis Hn. The denominator∑
mB(D|Hm)B(Hm) = B(D) just plays the roˆle of a normalizing constant
(Figure 3).
Bayes’ rule naturally applies to a sequential setting. Incorporating a new
observation Dt after having observed D1, D2, . . . , Dt−1 updates the beliefs as
B(Hn|D1 ∩ · · · ∩Dt) =
Bt(Dt|Hn)Bt(Hn)∑
mBt(Dt|Hm)B(Hm)
,
2More precisely, the axioms of beliefs as stated here imply the axioms of probability for
finitely additive measures over finite algebras. Furthermore, the axioms of beliefs also specify
a unique version of the conditional probability measure.
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D
Figure 3: Schematic Representation of Bayes’ Rule. The prior belief in hypothe-
ses H1, H2 and H3 is roughly uniform. After conditioning on the observation D,
the belief in hypothesis H3 increases significantly.
where for the t-th update,
Bt(Hn) := B(Hn|D1∩· · ·∩Dt−1) and Bt(Dt|Hn) := B(Dt|Hn∩D1∩· · ·∩Dt−1)
play the roˆle of the prior belief and the likelihood respectively. Note that
B(D1 ∩ · · · ∩Dt|Hn) =
t∏
τ=1
B(Dτ |Hn ∩D1 ∩ · · · ∩Dτ−1),
and hence each hypothesisHn naturally determines a probability measureB(·|Hn)
over sequences of observations.
PSfrag replacements
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Figure 4: Progressive refinement of the accuracy of the joint observation. The
sequence of observations D1, . . . , D5 leads to refinements S1, S2, . . . , S5, where
St = D1 ∩ · · · ∩ Dt. Note that S5 ⊂ H1 and therefore B(H1|S5) = 1, while
B(H2|S5) = B(H3|S5) = 0.
A smaller event D corresponds to a more “accurate” observation. Hence,
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making a new observation D′ necessarily improves the accuracy, since
D ⊃ D ∩D′.
In some cases, the accuracy of an observation (or sequence of observations) can
be so high that it uniquely identifies a hypothesis (Figure 4).
The way Bayes’ rule operates can be illustrated as follows. Consider a par-
tition {X1, . . . , XK} of Ω and let H∗ ∈ {H1, . . . , HN} be the true hypothesis,
i.e. the outcome ω ∈ Ω is drawn obeying propensities described by B(·|H∗).
The Xk represent different observations the reasoner can make. If ω is drawn
and reported to be in Xk, then the log-posterior probability of hypothesis Hn
is given by
logB(Hn|Xk) = logB(Xk|Hn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ln
+ logB(Hn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
pn
− logB(Xk)︸ ︷︷ ︸
c
.
This decomposition highlights all the relevant terms for understanding Bayesian
learning. The term ln is the log-likelihood of the dataXk. The term pn is the log-
prior of hypothesis Hn, which is a way of representing the relative confidence in
hypothesis Hn prior to seeing the data. In practice, it can also be interpreted as
(a) a complexity term, (b) the log-posterior resulting from “previous” inference
steps, or (c) an initialization term for the inference procedure. The term c is the
log-probability of the data, which is constant over the hypotheses, and thus does
not affect our analysis. Hence, log-posteriors are compared by their differences
in ln+pn. Ideally, the log-posterior should be maximum for the true hypothesis
Hn = H∗. However, since ω is chosen randomly, the log-posterior logB(Hn|Xk)
is a random quantity. If its variance is high enough, then a particular realization
of the data can lead to a log-posterior favoring some “wrong” hypotheses over
the true hypothesis, i.e. ln + pn > l∗ + p∗ for some Hn 6= H∗. In general, this
is an unavoidable problem (that necessarily haunts every statistical inference
method). Further insight can be gained by analyzing the expected log-posterior:∑
Xk
B(Xk|H∗) logB(Xk|Hn)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ln
+ logB(Hn)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pn=pn
−
∑
Xk
B(Xk|H∗) logB(Xk)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
.
This reveals3 that, on average, the log-likelihood Ln is indeed maximized by
Hn = H∗. Hence, the posterior belief will, on average, concentrate its mass on
the hypotheses having high Ln + Pn.
1.4 Conditioning on Events with Zero Belief
There is one technical point that merits closer inspection. Consider two eventsA,B ∈
F such that B ∩ A 6= ∅ but B(B) = 0. One has that
T(A|B) =
{
1 if B ⊂ A
? else
and B(A ∩B) = B(B)B(A|B) = 0
3For pi, qi probabilities,
∑
i
pi log qi is maximum when qi = pi for fixed pi.
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due to the definition of the truth function and due to Axiom B4. From this,
we conclude that B(A ∩ B) = 0. For B(A|B) there are two possible cases. If
B ⊂ A, then B(A|B) = 1 due to Axiom B2. However, if B 6⊂ A, then B(A|B)
is independent of the degree of belief B(C) of any event C ∈ F . More generally,
if D ∈ F is such that B(B|D) = 0, then the value of B(A|B) is independent of
the degree of belief B(C|D) of any event C ∈ F .
The bottom line is that conditioning on an event with zero belief is a well-
defined operation under the belief axioms outlined in Definition 2. This is not
so in the case of the probability axioms of measure theory. In measure theory,
the probability measure is a global measure µ over F , i.e. a function assigning
probability mass µ(A) to any event A ∈ F . However, implicit in this definition
is the fact that these masses are measured w.r.t. the certain event Ω. Because
of this, the information contained in the probability measure µ is insufficient
to uniquely determine the conditional probability measure µ(·|B) arising from
conditioning on an event B ∈ F having µ(B) = 0. In contrast, the belief
function B is a well-defined measure w.r.t. any conditioning event B ∈ F , i.e.
assigning probability mass B(A|B) to any event A ∈ F .
2 Causality
Suppose there is an unknown cause influencing a result we are waiting for. As
soon as we observe the result, we learn something about the unknown cause.
However, if instead we decide to interrupt the natural regime of the process by
choosing the result ourselves, then our knowledge about the unknown cause will
not change. This is simply because we know that our current actions cannot
change the past anymore. Meanwhile, in both cases, we learn something about
the future, i.e. about all the outcomes that will follow the result.
This distinction between belief updates following externally generated obser-
vations and internally generated actions is not modeled in Bayesian probability
theory. Essentially, the theory lacks the formal tools to deal with indeterminate
outcomes chosen by the reasoner himself. This requires introducing additional
information to clearly identify the past and the future of choices, or more ab-
stractly speaking, introducing a causal order of events.
3 Causal Spaces
The aim of this section is to introduce causal spaces. Causal spaces contain
enough information to characterize the causal structure of a random process.
Let Ω be a finite set of outcomes. An atom set A is a partition of Ω, and
an atom is a member A ∈ A. Given a set E of subsets of Ω, define the algebra
generated by E , written σ(E), as the smallest algebra over Ω containing every
member of E . Furthermore, define the atom set generated by an algebra F ,
written α(F), as the largest set of atoms containing members of F . For any set
E of subsets of Ω, we also abbreviate α(E) := α(σ(E)).
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Remark 5. In the finite case, it is easily seen that both generated algebras and
generated atom sets are unique.
Definition 4 (Primitive Events). Let E = (E0, E1, E2, . . . , EN ) be a finite
sequence of subsets of Ω called primitive events, where E0 := Ω, and where
for all n ≥ 1,
En /∈ σ
(
{E0, E1, . . . , En−1}
)
.
Furthermore, define En := {En, E
c
n} and A0,A1, . . . ,AN as the sequence of
atom sets
An := α
(
{E0, E1, . . . , En}
)
.
This setup is illustrated in Figure 5. The sequence of primitive events is
an abstract characterization of a random process that occurs in discrete steps
n = 1, 2, . . . , N . Each step n is associated with a primitive event En representing
a basic proposition whose truth value is resolved during this step (and not
before!), i.e. step n determines whether the outcome ω ∈ Ω is either in En or
in Ecn. The n-th atom set An contains one proposition for each possible path
the random process can take. Therefore, after n steps, the process will find itself
in one (and only one) of the members in An.
PSfrag replacements
E0
E1
E2
E3
A0 A1
A2 A3
Figure 5: Primitive Events and their Atom Sets.
Remark 6. The condition that En cannot be in the algebra generated by the
previous events E0, . . . , En−1 guarantees that En adds a new proposition that
cannot be expressed in terms of the previous propositions.
The sequence of primitive events E = (E1, . . . , EN ) can equivalently be
represented by any sequence E′ = (E′1, . . . , E
′
N ) where E
′
n ∈ En. Due to this,
we will call any member of En primitive event. We introduce causal functions.
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Definition 5 (Causal Axioms). Let Ω be a set of outcomes, and let E =
(E1, . . . , EN ) be a sequence of primitive events. A set function Cn is a n-th
causal function iff
C1. A ∈ En, B ∈ An−1, Cn(A|B) ∈ [0, 1].
C2. A ∈ En, B ∈ An−1, Cn(A|B) = 1 if B ⊂ A.
C3. A ∈ En, B ∈ An−1, Cn(A|B) = 0 if A ∩B = ∅.
C4. A ∈ En, B ∈ An−1, Cn(A|B) +Cn(A
c|B) = 1.
Hence, Cn maps En×An−1 into [0, 1]. A causal function over E is a function
C(A|B) = Cn(A|B), if A ∈ En, B ∈ An−1,
where Cn is an n-th causal function. Hence, C maps
⋃
n(En×An−1) into [0, 1].
The intuition behind this definition is as follows. The causal function speci-
fies the knowledge the reasoner has about the evolution of a random process. It
specifies the likelihood of a primitive event A ∈ En to happen after the random
process is known to have taken a path B ∈ An−1.
By comparing Axioms C1–C4 with Axioms B1–B5 (Section 1.2) of belief
functions, we observe the following. First, in contrast to B, only a subset of
combinations (A,B) ∈ F × F is specified for C, namely, the ones that chain
a history of primitive events B ∈ An−1 ⊂ F together with the primitive event
A ∈ En ⊂ F that immediately follows. Second, Axioms C1–C4 play the same
roˆle as Axioms B1–B4, namely: (C1) probabilities lie in the unit interval [0, 1];
(C2 & C3) probabilities are consistent with the truth function; and (C4) prob-
abilities of complementary events add up to one. No axiom analogous to Ax-
iom B5 is needed for C.
Putting everything together, one gets a causal space. A causal space contains
enough information to derive an associated belief space.
Definition 6 (Causal Space). A causal space is a tuple (Ω, E,C), where: Ω is
a set of outcomes, E is sequence of primitive events, and C is a causal function
over E.
Definition 7 (Induced Belief Space). Given a causal space (Ω, E,C), the in-
duced belief space is the belief space (Ω,F ,B) where the algebra F and the
belief function B are defined as
i. F = σ
(
{E0, E1, . . . , EN}
)
;
ii. B(A|B) = C(A|B), for all (A,B) ∈
⋃
n(En ×An−1).
Thus, the induced belief space is constructed by generating the algebra F
from the primitive events E, and by equating the belief function B to the causal
function C over the subset of F ×F where C is defined. The following theorem
tells us that this subset is enough to completely determine the whole belief
function.
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Theorem 2. The induced belief space exists and is unique.
Proof. Let F0,F1, . . . ,FN denote the sequence of algebras generated as
Fn := σ({E0, E1, . . . , En}).
Let r, s ∈ N, r ≤ s, be the smallest numbers such that B is Fr-measurable and
A is Fs-measurable. Let B ⊂ Ar and A ⊂ As be the partitions of B and A
respectively. Then, B(A|B) = 0 if A ∩B by the belief axioms, and
B(A|B) =
∑
a∈A
B(a|B)
otherwise, because the members a of A are disjoint. For every a ∈ A, let b ∈ B
be the unique member of the partition of B such that a ⊂ b. Obviously,
B(a|B) = B(a|b),
because a ∩B = a ∩ b. Let a1, a2, . . . , as the unique sequence aj ∈ Ej such that
a = a1 ∩ a2 ∩ · · · ∩ as =
s⋂
j=1
aj = b ∩
s⋂
j=r+1
aj ,
where the last equality comes from b = a1 ∩ · · · ∩ ar. Hence,
B(a|b) = B
( s⋂
j=r+1
aj
∣∣∣b) = s∏
j=r+1
B
(
aj
∣∣∣b∩ j−1⋂
i=r+1
ai
)
=
s∏
j=r+1
C
(
aj
∣∣∣b∩ j−1⋂
i=r+1
ai
)
.
The last replacement can be done because aj ∈ Ej and b ∩
⋂j−1
i=r+1 a
i ∈ Aj−1.
Thus, we have proven the following. First, F is unique because generated alge-
bras are unique. Second, we have shown, for arbitrarily chosen events A,B ∈ F ,
how to reexpress B(A|B) into an expression involving only terms of the form
C(C|D). Hence, it cannot be that B,B′ are both consistent with C and there
is A,B ∈ F such that B(A|B) 6= B′(A|B).
We now define the operation that specifies how the knowledge about the
random process transforms when the reasoner himself intervenes it.
Definition 8 (Intervention). Given a causal space (Ω, E,C) and a primitive
event A ∈ En for some n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, the A-intervention is the causal space
(Ω, E,C′) where for all (B,C) ∈
⋃
n(En ×An−1),
C′(B|C) =


1 if A = B and (B ∩ C) /∈ {∅, C},
0 if A = Bc and (B ∩ C) /∈ {∅, C},
C(B|C) else.
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This is an important definition. The reasoner ask himself the question:
“How do my beliefs about the world change if I were to choose the truth value
of a primitive event?” This is answered by directly changing the causal func-
tion accordingly (Figure 6). However, this change cannot contradict the logical
constraints given by the underlying truth function.
Remark 7. Note that (B∩C) /∈ {∅, C} ⇔ T(B|C) = ?. Hence, an intervention
can only affect primitive propositions B ∈ En that have an unresolved truth value
given the history C ∈ An−1. Moreover, the intervention resolves the truth value
of B. This makes intuitively sense.
PSfrag replacements
(a) (b)
E0
E1
E2
E3
Figure 6: An Intervention. The primitive events E = (E0, E1, E2, E3) are sets
on the unit interval. Panels (a) and (b) show a the causal space before and after
an Ec2-intervention respectively. This representation shows the atom sets A0 to
A3 and conditional probabilities (given by the relative lengths).
We will use the abbreviation Aˆ to denote A-interventions on a causal space.
When the underlying causal space (Ω, E,C) inducing a belief space (Ω,F ,B) is
clear from the context, then the expression B(B|Aˆ) denotes the belief B′(B|A)
measured w.r.t. the belief space (Ω,F ,B′) induced by the A-intervention of
(Ω, E,C). Furthermore, when A ∈ F is an event such that
A =
I⋂
i=1
Ai,
where each Ai is a primitive event, then the A-intervention is the causal space
resulting as the succession of Ai-interventions.
4 Concluding Remarks
We have shown how to derive a simple framework for reasoning under uncer-
tainty and intervention. This is achieved in three steps. First, we have restated
logic in set-theoretic terms to obtain a framework for reasoning under certainty.
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Second, we have extended this framework to model reasoning under uncertainty.
Finally, we have introduced causal spaces and shown how it provides enough
information to model knowledge containing causal information about the world.
This framework can be extended in many ways. Importantly, it has been
designed to be consistent with the literature on Bayesian statistics [Cox, 1961,
Jaynes and Bretthorst, 2003] and the literature on causality based on graphs
[Pearl, 2000, Spirtes et al., 2000, Dawid, 2010] and probability trees [Shafer,
1996].
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